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Abstract
There are clear benefits associated with a particular consumer choice
for many current markets. For example, as we consider here, some
products might carry environmental or ‘green’ benefits. Some con-
sumers might value these benefits while others do not. However, as
evidenced by myriad failed attempts of environmental products to
maintain even a niche market, such benefits do not necessarily out-
weigh the extra purchasing cost. The question we pose is, how can
such an initially economically-disadvantaged green product evolve to
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hold the greater share of the market? We present a simple mathe-
matical model for the dynamics of product competition in a hetero-
geneous consumer population. Our model preassigns a hierarchy to
the products, which designates the consumer choice when prices are
comparable, while prices are dynamically rescaled to reflect increasing
returns to scale. Our approach allows us to model many scenarios of
technology substitution and provides a method for generalizing mar-
ket forces. With this model, we begin to forecast irreversible trends
associated with consumer dynamics as well as policies that could be
made to influence transitions.
1 Introduction
The adoption of ‘green’ technology is hard to predict because it implies
many intertwined social and economic factors plus many retro-action
loops. Because even a partial description of these factors and their
interaction seems so intricate, authors are attracted by the multi-
agent modelling approach (see, e.g., [2] and the related special issue of
JASSS). But this approach suffers many limitations, especially when
it comes to obtain a full description of the dynamics in the parameter
space or to get some insight in what happens in the model and how
it can be compared to the real modelled system. This is especially
important because one might observe sharp changes in predictions in
very small areas of the parameter space (see also [7]).
We here propose a simple soluble model that takes into account
some of the intricacies of real life problems such as the heterogeneity
in consumer responses, social influence, and increasing returns to scale
of production prices but still condenses the set of parameters that can
lead to unwieldy complexity in simulation (see also [5] for a related
model, but without increasing returns to scale). The increasing re-
turns to scale could also be interpreted as increasing social pressure
to buy a specific product if most people around you do this, an argu-
ment already made by B. Arthur[1] . To maintain our analysis on the
competition between goods with different prices and different levels of
environmental soundness, we subsume that the influences of different
cultures, social influences, government policy, advertising can all be
summarized into a single curve, which we name the ‘willingness to
pay’ (WTP) function. WTP illuminates the consumer population dis-
tribution as a function of price and describes how people vary in their
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extent to which they want to pay for environmental benefits. We
assume this normalized WTP distribution has a fixed shape, while
the price associated with each market product varies with its market
share.
Our model has three ancillary assumptions. Firstly, given that
there are two products with prices below what a consumer is willing to
pay, this consumer chooses the ‘greener’ technology. The first assump-
tion implies that we can assume without further loss of generality also
that environmentally superior technologies are more expensive given
a similar market share. Given the first assumption, products that are
more expensive and less ‘green’ cannot survive in this market. Sec-
ondly, prices decrease with market shares. The combination of buyers
heterogeneity in WTP and increasing returns results in a rich vari-
ety of dynamical regimes with ultimately different prices and market
shares. Thirdly, we assume that while each product varies in maxi-
mum price, they each experience a similar extent of linear decreasing
returns to scale. This last assumption could very easily be relaxed in
future extensions of the model, but is not crucial for the implications
we derive in this paper.
In our investigation we focus our attention on a market competition
between three cars: a standard (0), hybrid (1), ‘green’ (2). Figure 1
shows a bell-shaped WTP distribution where the prices associated
with each car, p0, p1, and p2 determine the corresponding market
share areas, u0, u1, and u2, shaded in red, blue, and green, respec-
tively. Consumers with WTP larger than p2 choose car 2. Of the
remaining market share, consumers with WTP larger than p1 choose
car 1. Finally, from the still remaining market share, consumers with
WTP larger than p0 choose car 0. According to the WTP distribution,
some agents might decide to buy no car so that u0 + u1 + u2 ≤ 1.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our com-
putational model with equations. Section 3 describes our results. We
show that environmental technologies will take over when a signifi-
cant fraction of agents have already a WTP to pay for the green car
whatever its market share and when the increasing returns coefficient
is large (because of strong social effects or large production price re-
duction with production level). We also demonstrate how different
conditions can lead to car 0, 1, or 2 dominating the market depending
on the rescaling of price due to demand. Subsection 3.2 shows that
our simple model not only provides reliable results but also analytic
tools to evaluate multiple asymptotic solutions. For some parameter
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values, the dynamics have several attractors, which implies hysteresis
effects. We extrapolate that the timing of the subsidies and grants at
the immediate onset or emergence of a new technology may be cru-
cial as trends are sometimes irreversible. Section 4 summarizes our
conclusions and shows future direction for this model.
2 A Simple Set of Assumptions
We start the description of our model with explaining in more detail
our assumptions. We use the example of more or less green cars be-
low, but clearly any product for which there is some non-monetary
benefit related to the product can be used instead. So where we write
for convenience ‘car’ below, one could read ‘product,’ and when we
write environmental benefits or ‘greenness,’ one could read more non-
monetary benefits (ammenities).
• Consumers care about two aspects of a car, i.e., the price and
‘greenness’ of the car;
• Environmentally superior technologies are more expensive (given
a similar market share);
• Cars with a larger market share are cheaper;
• People vary in their extent to which they want to pay for envi-
ronmental benefits (heterogeneity of WTP) [3, 4, 6]
• People choose the alternative they prefer.
The second assumption is more for convenience than that it is
really necessary. Environmentally inferior technologies that are more
expensive would not be chosen by anybody, because consumers only
care about these two aspects.
The third assumption has also two possible interpretations. A
larger market share has advantages of scale for the producers, which
implies that cars can be produced for a lower price when the market
share is larger. From the buyers perspective, social influence effects
affect the utility consumers get from a product: a more popular car is
more attractive for most individuals than a car that nobody bought,
which changes the specific willingness to pay for that type of car. But
this is equivalent to saying that the price of that type of car decreases.
Since only the difference between WTP and prices is relevant to buy-
ers’ decisions, both effects have the same results [1]. In theory one
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should make a distinction between the production costs which are in-
fluenced by market shares say during the actual year, and the social
influence terms which takes into account how many cars of each type
have been bought in the past (the integrated yearly market share).
In practice, because of the irreversibility of the capital investment in
the automobile industry, the actual production cost also integrate in-
vestments and the two effects are driven by the integrated market
share.
There are three technological options: standard (0), intermediate
(1), ‘green’ (2).
• Each option i has its own maximum cost P0i, which equals the
cost at a zero market share;
• All options have the same linear returns to scale coefficient k
(i.e., pi = P0i − kui, where pi and ui are the actual price and
market share of product i, respectively;)
• There is one distribution of WTP for environmental benefits
(e.g., uniform or bell-shaped)
WTPp0 p1 p2
2
1
0
F
f
pdf
CDF
Figure 1: Distribution of willingness to pay (WTP) and market shares. Con-
sumers with WTP larger than pi may choose car i with market share ui equal
to the colored area.
Figure 1 shows an arbitrary distribution of WTP. Consumers with
WTP larger than pi may choose car i with market share ui equal to the
colored area. In the following subsection, we explain how the stable
market shares are computed.
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2.1 Equations
Given that we assume the same returns to scale, the price of a product
follows a linear return to scale function.
pi = P0i − kui (1)
Because of the influence of market share on actual prices, the order
among actual prices pi may differ from maximum prices at zero market
share. A first operation is to order products i. New indices j are used
for prices ordered by increasing actual prices, according to market
share distribution. Some products might lose their rank: in such a
case, we consider that every time a product j has larger price pj than
a product with a better environmental quality, it disappears from the
market: nobody is interested to buy a more expensive product with a
lower environmental quality. With final indices j, equilibrium market
shares obey:
uj = F (pj+1)− F (pj) (2)
where F (p) is the cumulative WTP distribution. This simple set of
equations is soluble, either directly for simple expressions of F (p), as
we do in section 3.2 on results or through transcendental equations.
While these equations provide the (possible multiple) solutions for
the stable proportions of each product in the market, one can also
simulate the dynamics to these solution by assuming that at each
point in time a certain proportion λ of consumers is choosing a new
car according to the prices and preferences at that point in time. The
related dynamics of market shares is given by:
uj(t+ 1) = (1− λ)uj(t) + λ(F (pj+1, t)− F (pj, t)) (3)
The simulations in this paper were done for two simple WTP dis-
tributions: the uniform distribution and a logit distribution. The cor-
responding equation for the cumulative distribution F (p) is piecewise
linear for the uniform distribution:
F (p) =
p− pm
pM − pm
(4)
between the minimum pm and the maximum pM WTP price. Below
pm, F (p) = 0, above pM , F (p) = 1.
6
ppdf and cdf
Figure 2: Distributions of willingness to pay (WTP). A uniform partial distri-
bution function (pdf) and the corresponding cumulative distribution function
(cdf) are drawn in black. The corresponding logit distributions are drawn in
red (bell-shaped for the pdf, S-shaped for the cdf).
For the bell-shaped cumulative distribution we use a logit expres-
sion:
F (p) =
1
1 + exp(−βp)
(5)
where β is inversely proportional to the width of the distribution. If we
define the width as the inverse slope at the point of inflexion (p = 0),
we obtain:
w =
4
β
. (6)
The corresponding graphs appear in figure 2.
3 Results
3.1 Time evolution of market shares
The evolution of market shares for the three products is easily simu-
lated for a fixed set of parameters. The two plots of figure 3 only differ
by the value of the maximum price of the green product P02. In both
cases, as in most simulations, only the standard product is initially
present (u0(t = 0) = 1, u1(0) = 0, u2(0) = 0). This corresponds with
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the assumption that we want to predict at which maximum prices it
is possible to enter the market for greener products.
Asymptotic market shares are reached in a few characteristic times
(λ)−1, where (λ)−1 corresponds to a minimum characteristic time of
evolution towards equilibrium.
The connection between the evolution of market shares and prices
is evident from figure 4, obtained for the same parameter values as
the right plot of figure 3. The initial increase of u1 and u2 decreases
u0, p1, and p2, and increases p0. Since p1 decreases slower than p2, u1
saturates after an initial increase and finally decreases. It is also clear
that due to the lower P02 in the right plot, the green car becomes the
dominant product in the market and completely drives out again the
intermediate car, while the standard car maintains a minority share
in the market
Because of the increase of p0, some consumers do not find any car
to buy (unless k is larger than the width of the distribution, see further
the section on hysteresis). The asymptotic sum of market shares is
then less than one. Such a situation is often encountered.
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Figure 3: Time evolutions of market shares: red standard, blue intermediate,
green ‘green’ products. (λ)−1 = 10.
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Figure 4: Time evolutions of market shares and prices.
3.2 Dynamical regimes
To obtain a more complete overview about how the parameters affect
the outcomes of the dynamics, we will now provide a more complete
overview of possible end points of the dynamics, which we label ‘dy-
namical regimes.’ The parameters are a priori:
• Two parameters defining the center of the WTP distribution and
its width (we only study symmetric distributions).
• The three maximum prices P0i.
• The slope k of the increasing returns expression.
They in fact reduce to four independent parameters, because only
the relative position of prices with respect to the WTP distribution is
important. We will find that only the ratio of k to the width of the
WTP distributions plays a role for simple distributions.
One should realize that λ is a kinetic parameter that only influences
how fast attractors are reached, but not the attractors themselves.
The following figures were made for constant maximum prices of
standard and green product, and for fixed WTP. We sometimes used
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uniform, and sometimes the logit distribution. The two varying pa-
rameters are then k and P01. This turns out to provide already a
quite complete overview of which dynamical regimes occur and how
they depend on the parameters.
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Figure 5: Asymptotic market shares as of function of k and P01. Uniform
WTP distribution [0,1], P00 = 0.5, P02 = 0.8. k varies between 0 (no return
to scale) and 0.5. P01 varies between P00 and P02. Green, blue, and red
corresponds to the market share of the green, intermediate, and standard
products, respectively.
For the above choice of parameters, whether the green product
becomes dominant depends essentially from how far P02 is from the
maximum WTP: in other words what is the potential market share
taking only into account the maximum price of the green product. Of
course, u2 increases with k. In fact, u2 is independent of P01 and P00.
At equilibrium it always obeys:
u2 = 1− F (P02 − ku2) (7)
since the ‘green’ product is always chosen when the customer’s WTP
is larger than p2.
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Figure 6: Asymptotic market shares as of function of k and P01. Uniform
WTP distribution [0,0.9]. All other items as in figure 5.
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Figure 7: Asymptotic market shares as of function of k and P01. Uniform
WTP distribution [0,1.1]. All other items as in the figure 5.
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For the uniform WTP distribution this gives:
u2 =
pM − P02
pM − pm − k
(8)
where pM and pm are respectively the upper and lower bound of the
WTP distribution. This expression is only valid for k < w (check the
hysteresis section for the opposite case). In addition, pM should be
larger than P02 otherwise u2 = 0. It shows that the market share of
the green car only depends upon two reduced parameters, pM−P02
pM−pm
and
k
pM−pm
.
The competition between the standard and intermediate car, on
the other hand, mostly depends upon P01: the standard car is favored
when P01 is close to P02, and the intermediate car when P01 is close
to P00.
For the uniform WTP distribution, equations (2) in u2, u1, and
u0 are easily solved; the expressions for u2, u1, and u0 depend of the
ranking of prices. In the case of p0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2, they are written in the
simple case of a [0,1] WTP distribution:
u2 =
1− P02
1− k
(9)
u1 =
p2 − P01
1− k
(10)
u0 =
p1 − P00
1− k
(11)
where actual prices p2 and p1 are obtained from the corresponding
values of ui. One sees from these equations that markets shares are
zero (and the equations have to be re-ordered) whenever pi+1 ≤ P0i.
These conditions re-written in terms of initial parameters are:
u1 = 0 iff P01 ≥
P02 − k
1− k
(12)
u0 = 0 iff either P00 ≥
P01
1− k
−
k(P02 − k)
(1− k)2
and P01 <
P02 − k
1− k
(13)
or P00 ≥
P02 − k
1− k
and P01 ≥
P02 − k
1− k
(14)
For more general distributions, e.g., the logit distribution, a similar
iterative procedure yields market shares and prices, but the equations
are transcendental rather than explicitly soluble.
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3.3 Hysteresis
Equations such as equation (2) are well-known in physics, e.g., in
the Mean Field theory of ferromagnetism [8] and to some extent in
economics [9, 10], in the case of increasing returns or social influence.
They are known to produce ‘phase’ or ‘regime’ transitions when the
number of their solutions goes from one to three as a function of a
parameter which is k/w in our case (for the logit distribution w =
4/β).
Figure 8 allows to easily understand the regime transition. It is a
graphical solution of equation (2) rewritten as:
1− u = F (p− ku). (15)
The curves corresponding to the two sides of the equation are drawn
in the plan (p − ku, 1 − u). The red and black curves correspond to
F (p − ku) (respectively, logit and uniform distributions). The blue
lines correspond to the left hand side 1 − u as a function of p − ku;
it is a straight line, which abscissa is p when u = 0 and p − k when
u = 1. Two blue lines are drawn corresponding to the two cases of a
large k, kM and a small k, km.
F=1−u
u
1−u
mM x=p−ku
1−u p
p−k p−k
Figure 8: Graphical solution of equation (2) rewritten as 1 − u = F (p −
ku). Abscissa is x = p − ku, and ordinate 1 − u. The F (x) curve (cdf),
represented in red for the logit distribution of WTP and in black for a uniform
distribution, intersects blue lines 1 − u in one or three points according to
the value of k for the particular choice of p. km ≤ 1 ≤ kM .
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Three solutions may be obtained if the slope of the straight line
1 − u is lower than the largest slope of the F function. This slope is
k/w for the uniform distribution and 4k/β for the logit distribution.
The corresponding conditions for k versus the WTP distribution pa-
rameters are thus written:
k ≥ w (16)
k ≥
4
β
(17)
When k is above the threshold, one or three fixed points are then
obtained depending upon the value of the maximum price. In the case
of three fixed points, the central one is unstable but the two extreme
are attractors; which attractor is actually reached depends upon initial
conditions: large u values attractor is, e.g., obtained when initially
u(0) = 1 (and small u attractor when u(0) = 0). The central fixed
point separates the two attractor regions.
We considered until now P02 as a fixed parameter. Let us now
discuss the effect of variations of P02, which could be due to techno-
logical progress or to strategic moves of the producer of car 2, or to
government subsidies etc. The two next figures illustrate the hysteresis
cycle when P02 is varied, and the transition between the two regimes
when both k and P02 are varied. They were drawn by superimposing
asymptotic simulation results obtained when initial conditions were
first u2(0) = 1 (red curves) and then when u2(0) = 0 (green curves).
In the first case, we thus start without standard or intermediate cars.
In the second case, we start with only standard cars. For parameters
such that only one attractor exists, only the green curves are visible.
But when two are possible, the red curves are visible and correspond
to u2(0) = 1.
The vertical transitions obtained in the parameter space for the at-
tractor at specific values of P02 still correspond to finite time dynamics
with a characteristic time of λ−1.
The middle part of figure 9 can be interpreted as follows. If we have
a market that is completely dominated by green cars, the maximum
price P02 has to rise almost up to 1.3 before the market is taken over
by the intermediate or standard car. On the opposite, if the green car
does not have a substantial share of the market, the price of the green
car has to drop almost to 0.7 before the green car can take over the
market.
At the middle of hysteresis loop, P02 is one width above the center
of the WTP distribution. But since k = 2, the actual price when
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Figure 9: A hysteresis cycle obtained for u2 when P02 is varied. The red
curve is u2 for u2(0) = 1 and the green curve when u2(0) = 0. The increasing
returns coefficient k = 2 is larger than the WTP distribution width w =
4/β = 1. The two curves coincide when the price P02 is either small or large.
They differ in the intermediate price region.
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u2 = 1 is one width below the center of the distribution. Large values
of k imply a strong social influence with respect to price differences:
varying u2 between 0 and 1 scans a large percentage of the WTP
distribution (96 percent). At the transition, k = 4
β
= 1, this figure is
already 63 percent.
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Figure 10: Transition between the hysteresis regime and the one attractor
regime when k = 4
β
. The green sheet is obtained when u2(0) = 1 and the red
sheet when u2(0) = 0. They differ only in the large k and intermediate P02
region.
We only discussed until now the dynamics of u2 as a function of
k and P02. Which of the two other products dominates or how they
share the market when u2 = 0 depends upon the actual values of P00
and P01.
Why should we care about hysteresis? After all, our starting as-
sumption was that the intermediate and the green options are intro-
duced after the standard option implying u0 = 1, u1 = u2 = 0 as initial
conditions. Since there are several attractors in this regime, the issue
of the adoption regime is especially sensitive to the parameter set-up:
if we now consider that parameters can be under the influence of deci-
sion makers such as producers or government agencies, or exogenous
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events (e.g., oil prices, technical advances), the hysteresis regime can
bring huge consequences for small parameter changes. For instance,
• If price P02 is lowered under the action of producers, advertising
in the media, or government subsidies, a transition from the
u2 ≃ 0 attractor to the u2 ≃ 1 attractor can be induced.
• Such an action does not have to be permanent: it might suffice
to bring u2 above the separatrix, the central fixed point, to bring
the system in the basin of attraction of high u2.
• Competitors might also have equivalent strategies.
• Sharp transition can be induced in this region through advertis-
ing by decision makers, thus changing effective prices for some
of the products or the complete WTP distribution.
Multiple attractors are a challenge for scientists, but they are op-
portunities for decision makers. Of course, parameter changes in the
single attractor regime also influence the outcome of the dynamics,
but their influence is far less dramatic. Moreover, these effects are re-
versed as the parameter changes are undone, while the changes under
multiple attractors might remain after parameter changes are undone.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have illustrated, how one can obtain interpretable
but already quite complex dynamics from a simple model on the com-
petition between more or less green technologies assuming that con-
sumers have heterogeneous preferences over these goods. In the first
part of the paper we have shown situations in which there was only
one attractor for the dynamics. These dynamics show that the prices
of the greener alternatives needs to be far enough from the boundary
of the willingness to pay distribution to take over the market as well as
that the advantages of scale should be large enough to overcome price
differences over time. Depending on the precise parameters, several
different regimes are possible, differing in the number of equilibrium
technologies: 1, 2, or 3. In some situations, green technologies take
over only a smaller part of the market, while the standard technology
remains dominant. But there are also situations were first the inter-
mediate technology conquers some of the market, and thereafter the
most green technology gains some market share and takes most of the
market.
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Simulations were done with parameters being constant, by defini-
tion. One can also infer the results of technological or attitude changes
over market shares dynamics. In situations in which there is basically
only one attractor, temporary policy measure will not have permanent
results because the process will reverse as soon as the policy measure
ends.
In the second part of the results, we show that there are also
situations in which there are multiple attractors of the dynamics. They
typically occur when the width of the willingness to pay distribution
is less than the increasing returns coefficient. As long as the market
share of the green products is either very small (or very high) the
market is stable. However, if some agency is able to raise for some
time the fraction of consumers using green cars, or if it could boost
for some period the environmental consciousness of enough consumers,
the system might jump to the situation in which most people drive in
green cars. Such temporary policy measures could then have a stable
result even if the measure is only temporary. Of course producers of
standard cars could think of measures to get back to the first situation,
but these would at least be quite costly for them.
Let us stress that these dynamic properties are generic: they do
not depend upon a specific choice of the WTP distribution nor of the
increasing return price function. They apply to any S-shape WTP
cumulative distribution and any monotonic increasing return function.
Many extensions of the present model are possible, some more ap-
plication specific, others including coupling with pollution and opinion
dynamics, the role of government agencies etc. Some of these exten-
sions might necessitate heavier simulation tools such as multi-agent
systems. But anyway, the simple analysis that has been performed
here already allows to figure out the influence of the parameters on
the observed dynamical regimes and the level of behavioral complexity
that can be expected for the heterogeneity of agents and increasing
return hypotheses.
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